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giovedì 17 maggio 2012

La tentazione turca

La tentazione turca: un gioco di specchi, per nascondere la realtà

Lo sapete, Mario Monti ha affermato che l'Italia (ossia quel Paese, il nostro, che non ha votato per avere come premier lo stesso Monti) vorrebbe la Turchia nell'Unione Europea. Secondo l'uomo della Trilaterale, il Paese anatolico costituirebbe una integrazione dinamica nel consesso europeo, da un punto di vista economico, demografico e geopolitico.

Negli ultimi anni, sia per la freddezza di alcuni Stati, come l'Austria e, ovviamente, Cipro, sia per la freddezza di alcuni Governi, come quello francese guidato da Nicolas Sarkozy, la questione dell'integrazione turca nell'UE era rimasta in sospeso. Oltre a ciò, la Turchia, a guida Erdogan, si stava mostrando al mondo come un centro d'influenza geopolitico, capace di riequilibrare il potere occidentale e israeliano, senza necessariamente entrarvi in conflitto, ma rappresentando un potere alternativo a quelli nell'area mediorientale.

Questo sino a ieri. Negli ultimi mesi le cose sono cambiate ed ecco riemergere la tentazione turca, intesa in due sensi. Da un lato, l'Unione Europea mostra nuovi segnali pro-Turchia, sia per le citate parole del premier italiano, sia per la mancata rielezione di Nicolas Sarkozy, oppositore alla Turchia in Europa, sia per la sconfitta elettorale di Angela Merkel, altra oppositrice alla Turchia, nel Nord Reno-Westfalia, con l'avanzare di politici meglio disposti rispetto all'integrazione turca (con riferimento, in particolare, al francese François Hollande).

Da questo punto di vista, va anche segnalato il documento della Commissione Europea 2012/0076 NLE, denominato (in maniera contorta e goffa):
Proposta di DECISIONE DEL CONSIGLIO sulla posizione da adottare a nome dell'Unione europea in seno al consiglio di associazione istituito dall'accordo che crea un'associazione tra la Comunità economica europea e la Turchia in merito alle disposizioni per il coordinamento dei regimi di sicurezza sociale [presenti, nel collegamento, varie traduzioni nei formati HTML, PDF o DOC]

Il documento, datato 30 marzo 2012, prevede, in pratica, l'estensione per Turchia, San Marino, Montenegro e Albania di analoga decisione assunta nel 2010, riguardante Algeria, Marocco, Tunisia, Croazia, Repubblica jugoslava di Macedonia ed Israele, allo scopo di facilitare l'inserimento dei rispettivi lavoratori immigrati nei Paesi dell'Unione Europea, senza alcun tipo di discriminazione possibile e con pieni diritti. In pratica, per un lavoratore turco o marocchino o israeliano o altro, i diritti saranno gli stessi di un qualunque cittadino italiano o di altra nazione europea dell'UE, con la sola condizione che i Paesi citati sopra offrano altrettanta apertura (come se un lavoratore olandese o tedesco potesse essere particolarmente interessato a spostarsi in Turchia o Marocco o Albania).

Si veda anche: I turchi nell’UE economica hanno gli stessi diritti dei residenti UE, Slog via traduzione su EFFEDIEFFE, 10 aprile 2012.

Considerando la situazione greca, col rischio della sua uscita dall'UE, o la disoccupazione giovanile che sempre in Grecia o in Spagna o in alcune regioni italiane raggiunge anche il 50%, sapere che la Commissione Europea, ossia un organo non-eletto, ma con potere legislativo e col potere di sanzionare gli Stati non recepenti le direttive comunitarie, si preoccupi di lavoratori non europei è un'altra delle assurdità di questa piovra mortifera che risponde al nome di Unione Europea.

Dall'altro lato, la Turchia stessa ha ripreso a guardare con altri occhi l'Occidente. Il 20 e 21 maggio, a Chicago ci sarà il vertice NATO, in cui si confermerà il completamento della prima fase del sistema missilistico di difesa nucleare, a cui ha deciso di partecipare anche la Turchia dal settembre 2011, ospitando, nel proprio territorio, il sistema di rilevazione radar.

Tale decisione indica un cambio di rotta importante nei rapporti con l'Occidente e rappresenta la fine della dottrina turca definita "zero problemi con i vicini", sostituita da un atteggiamento critico rispetto a certi regimi e da un atteggiamento simile a quello statunitense, di interferenza nelle altrui questioni. Ciò spiega i rapporti attuali con la Siria, trovatasi non solo scossa dal terrorismo importato dalla Penisola arabica e dai movimenti sponsorizzati dalle amministrazioni occidentali, ma anche dalla pressione del Governo di Ankara.

Sul sito di informazione geopolitica Dedefensa [vedere articolo più avanti] vengono ospitate alcune opinioni del diplomatico indiano M K Bhadrakumar, il quale, molto acutamente, fa notare come la Turchia sia passata, in un solo anno, da una ipotetica indipendenza e centralità geopolitica a poter essere causa dello scatenamento di un conflitto armato in Medio Oriente per proteggere il proprio confine siriano, divenendo perciò strumento della NATO (che con l'articolo 5 prevede l'intervento militare di tutti i suoi membri, se uno solo viene attaccato).

Come mai questo cambiamento nell'atteggiamento turco? Possiamo ipotizzare che molto sia dovuto alla Primavera Araba, ossia al timore di una estensione di tale fenomeno eterodiretto anche in territorio turco, con tutti i rischi che ciò comporterebbe.

Un'altra ipotesi è quella legata alla questione economica. La Turchia, infatti, è considerata una economia a forte crescita, a livelli quasi cinesi. Eppure esistono analisi alternative, che mettono in discussione la salute e la tenuta di quei livelli. Tali analisi (in parte contestate, perché portate avanti spesso da personalità ebraiche, quindi reputate "interessate") affermano che l'economia turca sia drogata. La crescita è dovuta al forte finanziamento delle banche da parte dello Stato, con una altrettanto forte politica di concessione di crediti al consumo, ma non alla produzione. Sembrerebbe, in pratica, lo scenario di una bolla futura. Inoltre, nonostante su alcuni mezzi d'informazione, specie italiani, si continui a parlare di crescita economica all'8% (dato del 2011, in realtà), le stime per il 2012 sono, sia per la Banca Mondiale, sia per la Banca Centrale Turca e per la Turkish Industry & Business Association, al 3 o al 4%, quindi decisamente più basse.

Report: Turkey most vulnerable to Eurozone shocks (The Southeast European Times, 5 marzo 2012)

Dopo il miracolo il collasso economico: la Turchia come l’Argentina? (Dan Segre, dal suo blog su Il Giornale, 30 dicembre 2011)

Ankara's "Economic Miracle" Collapses Changes in Turkey (David P. Goldman, Middle East Quarterly, Inverno 2012)

Instant obsolescence of the Turkish model (Spengler, Asia Times, 11 agosto 2011)

Recall notice for the Turkish model (Spengler, Asia Times, 10 gennaio 2012)

Worsening growth prospects for the global and Turkish economies (Asim Erdìlek, Today's Zaman, 26 gennaio 2012)

Che sotto-sotto vi siano timori sottaciuti per l'economia turca a rendere Ankara meno incline all'indipendenza e, allo stesso tempo, l'Unione Europea, come parte del campo occidentale, a temere meno l'integrazione/annessione della penisola anatolica?

  • Impressions de la catastrophique énigme turque (Dedefensa, 30 aprile 2012):
Le diplomate indien devenu commentateur M K Bhadrakumar est un esprit plein de sagesse. Bien que l’on puisse se trouver en désaccord avec certaines de ses analyses (c’est notre cas, pour ce qui concerne son analyse de la stratégie US et de l’état des USA, et des relations des USA avec la Russie), il existe des thèmes fondamentaux où sa sagesse rencontre son expérience pour nous éclairer de son brio. C’est le cas des relations entre pays du BRICS, de la stratégie du BRICS, de l’Inde, etc. C’est aussi le cas, et c’est là notre propos, de la Turquie, où M K Bhadrakumar fut ambassadeur de l’Inde.

Il est actuellement en séjour en Turquie, où il retrouve beaucoup d’amis, et d’où il peut nous livrer des analyses du plus haut intérêt sur la Turquie, – à l’heure où l’on peut se demander avec insistance : mais quelle mouche a donc piqué la Turquie ? – lorsqu’on songe à la position actuelle de ce pays dans sa politique internationale, par rapport à ce qu’elle était, par exemple, l’été dernier… C’est effectivement, nous semble-t-il, la question que le diplomate-commentateur se posait avant d’arriver dans ce pays. D’où l’intérêt de ses réponses, brèves mais très denses, sur la situation en Turquie, dans deux textes qu’il met en ligne sur son blog personnel, Indian Punchline.

• Dans le premier texte, le 27 avril 2012 ( http://blogs.rediff.com/mkbhadrakumar/2012/04/27/turkey-risks-losing-its-good-times/ ), il nous décrit, assis à une de ses terrasses favorites d’Istanboul, face au Bosphore, l’exceptionnelle réussite actuelle de la Turquie, du point de vue intérieur, économique, social et culturel, ce qui constitue un triomphe pour Erdogan et son parti. Puis, soudain, vient la réserve majeure que nous attendons tous, bien entendu, – et quelle réserve… (Nous nous permettons de souligner de gras une remarque qui nous paraît de la plus haute sagacité, que nous utiliserons pour notre commentaire.)

«…But Turkey is getting things horribly wrong in its foreign policy. The curious thing is that Erdogan’s foreign policy lacks a national consensus and yet this politician who is an ardent democrat is nonchalantly pressing ahead. The intellectuals I met are aghast that Turkey is reclaiming its Ottoman legacy and is needlessly getting entangled in the Muslim Middle East.

»Yesterday, there was a passionate debate in the Turkish parliament over Erdogan’s Syria policy. I am told that not only the Kemalists but also the ultra-nationalists and even the Kurdish party from the eastern region of Turkey were critical that Turkey is interfering in Syria and it is going to provoke a vicious backlash. But FM Ahmet Davitoglu came up with a spirited defence. He said something like, ‘Turkey owns, leads, serves the new Middle East’.

»Haven’t I heard this bravado before? Yes, I used to hear this in the cocktail circuit in Ankara during the tragic Bosnian war. Turkey used to fancy that it was going to ‘own, lead and serve’ the new Balkans. Pray, what happened? Funnily, the Balkans and Central Europe aren’t Turkey’s backyards by any reckoning. They are not even America’s. If newspaper reports are to be believed, they are probably going to be China’s backyard. Not 6 or 10, but sixteen heads of governments travelled to Warsaw from far and wide in the Balkans and Central Europe to greet Premier Wen Jiabao. Yes, these were ‘New Europeans’ who were supposed to be America’s vassals.

»Isn’t Turkey following the footsteps of the US — getting bogged down in quagmires some place else where angels fear to tread, and somewhere along the line losing the plot? I feel sorry for this country and its gifted people. When things have been going so brilliantly well, Erdogan has lost his way.»

• Deux jours plus tard, le 29 avril 2012 ( http://blogs.rediff.com/mkbhadrakumar/2012/04/29/turkey-in-a-middle-eastern-fantasyland/ ), M K Bhadrakumar nous fait un rapport succinct d’une conférence du principal parti d’opposition, le Parti Républicain du Peuple (CHP), et de sa verte et superbe critique de la politique extérieure d’Erdogan, essentiellement de sa catastrophique politique syrienne, confirmant les impressions rapportées plus haut… «The deputy head of CHP, Faruk Logoglu (who used to be the head of the foreign ministry during my tenure as ambassador in Ankara) made some exceptionally sharp criticism against the Recep Erdogan government’s Middle East policies. He called them ‘dangerous fantasy’. Turkish discourses have acquired great transparency — ironically, a legacy of the Erdogan era. Logoglu was blunt about Turkey’s covert help to Syrian fighters opposing the regime in Damascus.»

Puis il poursuit en approuvant («There is merit in the criticism that Turkey is in a fantasyland, regarding itself as a role model for the Middle East…»), puis en rapportant l’un ou l’autre débat en cours. M K Bhadrakumar n’hésite pas à montrer la dérision de la chose, puisqu’il s’agit d’un débat sur le port du foulard par les femmes, et quand, et où, – voilà qui nous rappelle nos activités à nous, dans le bloc BAO, – et cela au milieu de la tempête qui secoue le monde… Dérision, dérision…

«I believe, the women’s wing of the ruling party Justice and Development Party demanded yesterday that Turkish women should be allowed to wear headscarves in all public places and that the state should “stop imposing secularism”. But it made a distinction: while women members of parliament should be allowed to wear headscarves, women serving in the judiciary, security establishment and schools and colleges should continue to be barred from wearing headscarves. Again, while teachers shouldn’t wear headscarves, students should be free to wear them.

»I am foxed at such hair-splititng. So are my stylish Turkish friends who of course like to defiantly flaunt their lovely blond hair. Why is Turkey wasting its time over archaic issues in the second decade of the 21st century?»

Alors, la Turquie est-elle encore une énigme ? Catastrophique dans sa politique étrangère, sans aucun doute, mais énigme, finalement, certes pas… Il y a neuf mois, tout semblait promis à la Turquie et à son triomphant Premier ministre. En septembre 2011, il fit une tournée qui, à son escale égyptienne, sembla concrétiser un rôle nouveau, fondamental, pour la Turquie dans la région (voir notamment le 14 septembre 2011) ( http://www.dedefensa.org/article-barack_erdogan_la_rock_star_du_caire_14_09_2011.html ). Aujourd’hui, elle est embourbée dans une politique maximaliste absurde en Syrie ; une politique sans la moindre substance, appuyée sur des contre-vérités, produisant des effets contradictoires dévastateurs ; une politique déstructurante, dissolvante, embrassant les pires vanités idéologiques du bloc BAO inféodé au parti des salonards, politique trompeuse, fabriquée, imitant la stupide lourdeur des poussières de monarchies du Golfe, croulant sous le poids de la corruption, de l’argent et de la sclérose du plus trompeur et du plus faux des conservatismes, le conservatisme faussaire de la corruption qui conduit à la dissolution des structures et des principes ( http://www.dedefensa.org/article-assange_face_au_parti_unique_des_salonards_20_04_2012.html ) ( http://www.dedefensa.org/article-de_la_guerre_qui_n_a_pas_eu_lieu_en_syrie_02_04_2012.html ). Le pire est que cette politique syrienne se répand comme une métastase et infecte tout le reste de la politique extérieure turque.

Le tournant profond effectué par la Turquie, après une préparation d’une décennie, eut lieu en 2009-2010. Il fut essentiellement appuyé sur une attitude brusquement critique d’Israël, et une nette prise de distance des USA (l’un ne va pas sans l’autre) et du bloc BAO. C’est cette évolution qui valut à Erdogan son triomphe du Caire, et la position évidente de dirigeant musulman le plus populaire dans le Moyen-Orient, auprès des masses arabes, une sorte de successeur de Nasser dans cet art difficile de l’influence et du charisme. Puis vint l’affaire syrienne. Nous avancerions l’hypothèse que la direction turque, Erdogan et son ministre des affaires étrangères principalement, s’engagèrent dans ce guêpier selon deux conceptions d’analyse ; celle qu’avec une telle popularité, une telle influence, la Turquie était désormais le pays dominant par excellence de la région, celui par qui passent toutes les formules et les démarches de règlement, et cela valant aussi bien, naturellement, pour la Syrie ; celle qu’avec les relations (excellentes alors) existantes avec la Syrie, il s’agirait d’une partie facile, qui devrait s’accompagner de réformes significatives de la direction syrienne. La démarche se heurta à la résistance d’Assad, et notre appréciation est que l’attitude impérative de la Turquie vis-à-vis de la Syrie tint une bonne part de l’échec d’un arrangement éventuel. Erdogan réagit avec intransigeance, à partir d’une position personnelle marquée par cette faiblesse terrible des puissances trop vite affirmées, et manquant de la retenue que donne la sagesse ; en fait de sagesse, Erdogan montra cet hubris caractéristique, qui le conduisit à la rupture puis au maximalisme à l’encontre d’Assad, jusqu’à l’absurde situation présente. C’est ce que M K Bhadrakumar définit par ce jugement : «Erdogan has lost his way…»

Aujourd’hui, la Turquie, qui prétendait régenter le Moyen-Orient dans l’ordre nouveau du “printemps arabe”, se retrouve du côté des perturbateurs et des déstabilisateurs, effectivement embourbée dans la dangereuse proximité d’une guerre civile rampante, et continuellement poussé à une surenchère stérile… C’est ce que M K Bhadrakumar définit par cet autre jugement : «Turkey [is] following the footsteps of the US.» Pire encore, puisque la Turquie n’a pas la position de force des USA ; la voici réintégrant la dynamique des pays du bloc BAO, allant jusqu’à menacer (?) de faire jouer l’Article 5 de l’OTAN pour “protéger” sa frontière syrienne… Le grand pays rénovateur et émancipateur du Moyen-Orient d’il y a un an qui serait l’instrument direct de l’intervention de l’OTAN au Moyen-Orient ! Le comble du gâchis, au-delà de la maladresse, pour un avantage net dont on cherche en vain les premiers signes ; Erdogan n’a peut-être plus intérêt à aller tester sa popularité au Caire, aujourd’hui. Le reste va à l’avenant : des relations beaucoup plus tièdes avec la Russie et l’Iran, sans aucun avantage réel par ailleurs (les relations avec les monarchies du Golfe ne représentent aucune assurance, ces pays entretenant une politique extérieure de fortune, eux-mêmes assiégés par leur propre instabilité et leur illégitimité).

On dirait que la Turquie d’Erdogan, qui s’était superbement échappée du Système, est retombée dans ses rets, jusqu’à ses dérisoires débats type “droitdel’hommisme” des société “modernes” dignes de nos pauvres pays européens, – comme si elle avait été piquée, quelque part depuis la fin de l’été 2011, par la tarentule de la modernité. Même si son côté l’emportait en Syrie, – et nous en sommes loin, – Erdogan n’aurait fait alors qu’installer une instabilité dangereuse sur ses frontières, au-delà de tous les calculs savants des géopoliticiens et des connaisseurs des nuances diverses du monde musulman. Ici comme ailleurs dans toutes les crises qui touchent le monde arabo-musulman, ce n’est pas un de ces conflits pleins de nuances et d’intérêts régionaux autant que d'attirance pour des ressources diverses qui est en cours en Syrie, mais d’abord une pression de la déstructuration propre au Système où la communication joue un rôle fondamental, et la Turquie se trouve en son cœur. S’il poursuit dans cette voie, qui est si contraire au sentiment général turc, Erdogan finirait bien par voir sa position intérieure menacée par des oppositions qui en viendraient à se réclamer de la politique initiale qu’il avait si magnifiquement mise en place. (Ce jugement de M K Bhadrakumar sonne comme un avertissement : «The curious thing is that Erdogan’s foreign policy lacks a national consensus and yet this politician who is an ardent democrat is nonchalantly pressing ahead.») Une victime de plus de la dynamique surpuissance-autodestruction du Système, qui emporte dans sa logique autodestructrice ceux qui s’y rallient involontairement en croyant pouvoir la dompter…

En post scriptum, on notera l'ultime et sympathique paradoxe de cette affaire, illustré par le jugement de M K Bhadrakumar et notre hypothèse sur la baisse de popularité éventuelle d'Erdogan. En abandonnant, voire en trahissant sa propre et brillante politique, Erdogan mettrait en évidence qu'elle a pénétré et conquis la classe politique et le pays ; il aurait donc eu raison malgré tout, et contre lui-même ensuite.

  • Re-allying with old allies (intervista a Mustafa Aydın di Barçın Yinanç, Hürriyet Daily News, 5 maggio 2012):
As NATO prepares to announce the completion of the first important phase of its ambitious nuclear missile defense system during the alliance’s Chicago summit this month, Turkey’s decision last September to host the early warning radar system for the shield has proved to be a turning point in the government’s relations with the West, said Professor Mustafa Aydın, the rector of Kadir Has University. Aydın is also the head of the International Relations Council, which has been organizing brain-storming meetings on security issues in several cities throughout Turkey on the occasion of Turkey’s 60th year of NATO membership. By hosting the radars, “the government chooses its side. It gives the message to the world that Turkey will continue to act with the West,” he said.

Meanwhile with his recent statement that Turkey will lead the wave of change in the Middle East, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has announced the end of the “zero problems with neighbors” policy. “In the past Turkey used to say, ‘I am indifferent to who is in the government. I will be friends with everybody.’ Now it says, ‘I determine the people and administrations with which I will be friends and I will make sure they come to power in the government,’” Aydın told the Hürriyet Daily News.

HDN
Q: What was the feedback you received from the meetings you held in different cities in Turkey?



A. We also conduct opinion polls, and we can test the views in the polls during our talks. Turks continue to surprise. In general, 60 to 70 percent of Turks believe Turkey should continue to be a member of NATO. But Turks still don’t have a clear idea of what NATO is. We are not sure what it is. We sort of feel it’s a good thing and provides security, but we have no clue as to how it functions. Yet the importance of NATO is the fact that we have an equal say with other members. We have veto power. Nothing objected to by Turkey can become a decision in NATO. But [in the eyes of the people] it is as if there is an international organization there which is controlled especially by the United States. Americans use NATO to accomplish what they want. The impression among ordinary citizens is that Turkey is a weak country and that Turkey is forced to accept things contradictory to its will. Obviously this is not the reality. NATO gives us the means to be in the game and to affect the decisions that are being made. This, however, is not known by the people.

Q: It seems that this misperception has existed for the past 60 years.

A: When you go to another NATO member, people can severely criticize the alliance. But they will say, “We, NATO.” In Turkey, both the politicians and the people talk as if NATO forms policies and Turkey does not contribute to these policies, as if we are not in NATO or as if we are not taken seriously in NATO. This has not been explained to the people for 60 years. But I am not suggesting that people are totally influenced by politicians. Sometimes politicians act accordingly as they see this is the feeling among the people.

Q: What are the other points Turks continue to find surprising?


A: Actually, we’ve started not to get surprised at this point. In Turkey we have internalized the concept of “There is no other friend to a Turk than a Turk.” Everybody is our enemy; we should trust no one but ourselves. You can see this type of feeling in other countries as well, but in Turkey’s case this goes to the extreme. In opinion polls you have around 70 percent of people saying Turkey should act alone. I call this “the lone wolf syndrome.” You can feel this during the meetings as well. Conspiracy theories are extremely widespread.

Q: What is the role of NATO in Turkey’s foreign policy?


A: Very important. If I had to say it in one phrase; it’s Turkey’s link to the West. NATO is the strongest and only institution in Turkey’s decades-long integration efforts to the West. Our position with the European Union is unclear, it’s not clear what the Council of Europe is; at the end of the day we are also a member of UEFA. But at the end of the day when we talk about security, NATO is the nearest point we are in regarding the Western decision-making mechanism. There is a Western alliance that came out victorious from the Cold War, defeating its rival. We in Turkey never felt that we were in the winning part of the alliance. This of course has to do with the fact that Turkey became surrounded by several conflicts after the Cold War. But it has also to do with the fact that we never totally felt a part of that club. But when you look today at the powers that are shaping the world, when we look to where decisions are made behind closed doors, well, one of the places where decisions are taken is NATO.

Q: But at one stage the relevance of NATO has been questioned.

A: Yes, but NATO changed its function. There was no reason for NATO to continue its Cold War presence the way it did. NATO was formed to counter nuclear or non-nuclear threats from the Soviet Union and as the Soviet Union collapsed it was clear there was no need for that type of NATO. But in time we started to face international terrorism problems, cyber attacks etc. The issue of international intervention came on the agenda. Who is going to do that? Leave aside military operations. When you want to take humanitarian aid to a crisis region in the word, you rely on NATO’s infrastructure and experience. NATO is still relevant today since it has transformed itself. NATO is still very important today for providing security to Turkey. There is no conventional threat for Turkey to fear, but this is not the case when we are talking about unconventional threats. Turkey is still under the NATO umbrella when it comes to countering threats of ballistic missiles or nuclear arms. The primary reason why we have entered into NATO’s nuclear defense shield system is the fact that we do not have our own national nuclear defense system.

Q: Many believe Turkey’s decision to host the radars for NATO’s nuclear defense shield was a turning point in Turkey’s relations with the alliance and the U.S. Do you share this view?


A: I agreed that it has been a very important turning point, but this decision was not just limited to refreshing mutual confidence. I look at the bigger picture. Turkey’s links to the West were questioned. Recall the discussions on whether Turkey was changing its axis. There was confusion. The [nuclear defense shield] decision is a psychological sign that Turkey, under the ruling Justice and Development Party, has chosen its side. What does Turkey want? It wants to be powerful in its region. It wants to have good relations in its neighborhood. But when it comes to joint decisions about the future of the world, Turkey says “We still want to move together with the West and want to cooperate more with the U.S.,” and this [hosting the radars] is not an isolated decision. Look at the change in rhetoric of the politicians. Take the example of Syria. Turkey and the U.S. have similar policies and similar rhetoric on Syria. It was absolutely the opposite a bit ago. Turkey’s prime minister went to Egypt and told the Egyptians to have a secular constitution. Was his message to Egyptians, to Turks or to the West? We need to ask this question as the amount of oil bought from Iran starts to diminish. All these are messages that say “I will act with the West in shaping the world; I want to be an influential country in this region, but I’ll do this without cutting my links to the West.”

Q: How do you assess Davutoğlu’s last speech where he said Turkey will lead the wave of change in the Middle East?

A: Some elements of his speech already existed in the foreign policy discourse of the past year. He had already said that Turkey will set the order. States can come up in certain periods with foreign policy visions or doctrines. In the U.S. we witnessed such doctrines like the Reagan doctrine or the Bush doctrine. This has nearly never happened in Turkey. There has been only one foreign policy vision of that type in the republic’s history and that was “Peace at home, peace in the world.” From the time he became foreign minister to now, in four years time, we’ve heard two statements of vision which have been in contradiction to each other. “Zero problems with neighbors” was a big doctrinaire statement. You might agree or disagree. A rhetoric was endorsed. We explained it to the world. But the latest statement is a totally different vision. The minister himself announced the end of the “zero problems with neighbors” policy.

Q: What makes it is so contradictory?


A: Because it presents a very different vision. You say “I will be the one to enforce the change, to stand behind the change.” In the “zero problems” policy you said, “I am indifferent to the rulers in a region. I will solve the problems we have with them. I will befriend everybody. I’ll be their friend and brother.” Right now you say “I am interested in who is in power in the region. I am interested in what kind of people are in government. I will make the effort to change them.” You no longer say “I will be friends with everybody.” You say “I have established the people and administrations whom I will befriend and I will make sure they come to power.” This is similar to Clinton’s doctrine, which was based on the promotion of democracy.

1 commento:

  1. Post: «Mario Monti ha affermato che l'Italia [...] vorrebbe la Turchia nell'Unione Europea»

    Dottore, io NON vorrei la Turchia in Europa. Che dice, sono grave? Non sono abbastanza Italiano? Non sono un BUON Italiano?

    RispondiElimina